Introduction
The concept of separation plays a major role in Plato scholarship since the very beginning of this tradition, when Aristotle decided to comment on his master's work. Aristotle takes separation as a central feature of Plato's ontology and ends most of his time dedicated to Plato in the Metaphysics criticizing this single attribute of the Forms. Surprisingly, Plato himself almost never uses the term to describe the Forms or the relationship between Forms and particulars, the only exception being the opening moments of Socrates' discussion with Parmenides in the dialo ue named after the great Eleatic philosopher .
As we could expect, Plato's failure to refer to "separation" made some scholars believe that this was not an important feature of his ontology after a l, or even that it was not one of his metaphysical claims (see Fine, 1984 Fine, , 1986 also Dancy, 1991) . However, since Aristotle, for many different reasons, is in a very privileged position on the issue of how to understand Plato's Philosophy, I take it for granted that the concept of separation has a central function in Plato's theory of reality. What I do not take for granted is that we should understand Plato's concept of "separation" based on Aristotle's criticism of it. So, in this paper, I wi l look for ways to understand "separation" in Plato regar less of what Aristotle says of it, e ecia ly regar less of the technicalities Aristotle brings to the discussion.
At this point, I am sure the reader expects me to start a discussion about Phaedo's Affinity Ar ument (Phd. 7 b-84b) in order to e a lish analogies between the separated souls and 
Analysis of 74b7-9
The sentence to be considered in this paper (Phd. 74b7-9) has for a long time been a source of controversy both among translators and philosophers. The main reason for that is the fact that its interpretation depends on a series of judgments about Greek syntax. In this section, I wi l present the different syntactical readings for the sentence and discuss some of the philosophical consequences related to them.
The context is of great importance since the sentence hap ens to be located in the context of one of the most famous statements of Socrates's theory of reco lection . In this part of his ar ument, Socrates makes the very straightforward claim that equal sticks or stones are inevita ly also unequal. Since, on the other hand, the Equal itself cannot betray any measure of inequality, the particular sticks and stones and the Equal itself are not the same. Equal sticks and stones can, however, remind the soul of the Equal itself, which the soul must have contemplated before incarnation. Therefore, the ar ument seems to go, the human soul is immortal.
For the sake of my present ar umentation the passage is e ecia ly important because it represents one out of a very sma l number of explicit ar uments that Plato gives for the claim that Forms are distinct from sensi le objects. Therefore, I wish to focus on the step in which Plato states the differences between these two kinds of entities: the Equal itself and equal sticks and stones. For the time being, let's assume the fo lowing translation for the passage: The ar ument rests on the claim that Forms and sensile objects have distinct features. While sensi le equals also ap ear/are unequal, the Form of Equal does not ap ear/is unequal. The difficulties begin when we try to understand in what sense the equal sticks and stones can also be unequal, and, on the other hand, in what sense the Equal itself cannot be unequal. There seem to be several options of reading each one with its pros and cons.
The Greek text for the ecific lines I want to consider is the fo lowing:
ἆρ› οὐ λίθοι μὲν ἴσοι καὶ ξύλα ἐνίοτε ταὐτὰ ὄντα τῷ μὲν ἴσα φαίνεται, τῷ δ› οὔ .
In order to understand the cor ect meaning of this sentence, we must first deal with the fact that the verb φαίνομαι has two distinct uses. If it is fo lowed by an infinitive, its meaning is "ap ears to be" or "seems to be" with the possile a dition "but is not" . On the other hand, if it is fo lowed by a participle, it means "seems to be" or "is observed to be" with the possi le a dition "and rea ly is" . Since the text does not provide either one of the complements, the interpreter must decide for himself which sense Plato intended to convey. And, of course, there are philosophical consequences attached to that choice.
For some interpreters the mere fact that sensi le particulars can generate contrary perceptions is sufficient to differentiate them from the Forms, even if they are not in themselves contradictory entities. This line of interpretation reads φαίνεται as fo lowed by an elided infinitive and was advocated, for instance, by Archer-Hind, for whom "the existence of a conflict of opinion is sufficient to e a lish the differences between the particulars and the Idea: in the case of the latter no such conflict does or can exist" (1883, p. 37). Others, however, maintain that Socrates would need more in order to distin uish Forms from particulars, e ecia ly in view of Socrates' further claim that equal sticks and stones are in themselves somehow deficient when compared with the Equal itself. For those interpreters, Socrates would need to ta k about the actual properties of Forms and things, and not about how these things a pea to be. But for that claim to be made, Plato would need an elided participle after φαίνεται (see, for example, Hackforth, 1955, p. 75; Bluck, 1955, p. 76) .
Another point of dispute is the cor ect understanding of the pronouns τῷ μὲν ... τῷ δ' οὔ. These words offer an even wider range of possi le readings. First of a l, there is a family of Filosofi a Unisinos -Unisinos Journal of Philosophy -18(3): 184-188, sep/dec 2017 manuscripts in which these words are replaced by τότε μὲν … τότε δ' οὔ, which would be translated "sometimes sticks and stones, while being the same, at one time ap ear equal, at another time not" .
3 On this reading, Socrates' point is that a pair of equal sticks, while remaining the same pair of sticks, is at one time equal and at another time unequal, because they have changed. Or, if we assume an elided infinitive after φαίνεται, his point would rather be that a pair of equal sticks or stones, while remaining exactly the same, see s now equal and now unequal not because of their changing, but due to a change in the perective of the observer. And this contrasts with the Form of Equality, which never changes nor even see s to be unequal.
Although there is a re ecta le manuscript tradition for this reading of the Greek text, it must be noted that this replacement would make the use of ἐνίοτε in the sentence a little awkward: "sometimes... at one time… at another time" (ἐνίοτε… τότε… τότε). Besides, stones are certainly not the best sensi le entities to i lustrate changes over time. No doubt stones actua ly change over time, but they certainly are not the most natural example to make the point that sensi le things change while Forms do not.
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On the other hand, if we choose to adopt the manuscript tradition that reads τῷ μὲν ... τῷ δ' οὔ instead of τότε μὲν … τότε δ' οὔ, things are not rea ly better. For we can attribute three very different meanings to the sentence according to the gender we assign to the pronouns.
The pronouns can be masculine and, in this case, the sentence would be translated as: "sometimes, sticks and stones, while being the same, seem equal to one person but not to another person" . A pair of sticks one meter long, for instance, seems equal to one observer and unequal to another. 5 On initial consideration, this interpretation ap ears to be satisfactory, mostly because it offers a natural translation of the Greek. However, on conceptual grounds it seems problematic. Could it not be the case that the judgment of one of the two people is just wrong? Besides, why would Socrates explain the ontological differences between Forms and sensile particulars solely on the ground that one is capa le of misap rehending sensi le objects, but not Forms? Again, many critics emphasize that Socrates would rather make a point about these things in themselves, and not about the human ap rehension of them.
Another option is to consider the pronouns as neutral and to render the sentence as "sometimes, sticks and stones, while being the same, ap ear equal to one thing but not to another thing" . 6 In this case, we would not be ta king about a pair of sticks or stones. Socrates' point would rather be that a given stick one meter long is equal to another one of the same size but unequal to a third stick half-meter long. This reading has the advantage of resulting in an obviously true statement. Since "to be equal" is a relation between two things, to change the second member of the relation would eventua ly lead to the case where the two things are not equal. The pro lem of this reading is that it would make no sense of ἐνίοτε again. A stick or stone wi l always be equal to something and unequal to another. So, why would Socrates say that this scenario hap ens only "sometimes" (ἐνίοτε)?
A third possibility is to read the pronouns again as neutral, but this time confer ing to them an adverbial force. In this case, we should translate the sentence as: "sometimes, sticks and stones, while being the same, seem equal in one reect but not in another re ect" (see Haynes, 1964, p. 19-21) . The point would be that a given pair of sticks can be equal in size while being unequal in, say, thickness. This adverbial reading has the advantage of leaving un ecified the a ect in which the sticks and stones are equal or unequal. As a result, it implicitly includes a l the other possibilities mentioned before. Its downside, however, is that it is not usual at a l to have a neutral pronoun a ing as an adverb. As remarked by Bostock (1986, p. 74) , one would certainly expect the feminine pronoun in an adverbial construction like this.
Although commentators have a long debate about which one of the above mentioned options is the one that better conveys Plato's intentions, I think that we should consider the possibility that Plato is actua ly leaving the text open for these different readings. According to this interpretation, Plato would have chosen a deliberately va ue form of writing in order to state the fact that sensi le objects are contradictory in many different ways, a l of them expressed by the op osition of relative pronouns.
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This possibility becomes more likely when we compare these lines of the Phaedo with a passage of the Symposium (211a2-5). In this Symposium's passage, Diotima tries to explain to Socrates the differences between Beauty itself and other beautiful things:
First, then, it is always, neither coming to be nor passing away, neither increasing nor
Filosofi a Unisinos -Unisinos Journal of Philosophy -18(3): 184-188, sep/dec 2017 diminishing. Next, it is not beautiful in one respect and ugly in another respect (τῇ μὲν καλόν, τῇ δ' αἰσχρόν), nor [beautiful] at one time and not at another (τοτὲ μέν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ), nor beautiful compared with one thing and ugly compared with another (πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν), nor beautiful in one place and ugly in another, so as to be beautiful to some and ugly to others (ἔνθα μὲν καλόν, ἔνθα δὲ αἰσχρόν, ὡς τισὶ μὲν ὂν καλόν, τισὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν).
πρῶτον μὲν ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον, οὔτε αὐξανόμενον οὔτε φθίνον, ἔπειτα οὐ τῇ μὲν καλόν, τῇ δ› αἰσχρόν, οὐδὲ τοτὲ μέν, τοτὲ δὲ οὔ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλόν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρόν, οὐδ› ἔνθα μὲν καλόν, ἔνθα δὲ αἰσχρόν, ὡς τισὶ μὲν ὂν καλόν, τισὶ δὲ αἰσχρόν (Smp. 211a2-5).
As we can see, the three possi le readings for the ambiguous pronouns of the sentence in the Phaedo plus the version with the adverb of time τοτὲ, which we dismissed on textual grounds, are here laid out by Diotima as different ways in which a beautiful thing can be ugly. We l, the same goes for equal sticks and stones. There are various ways in which sensi le equals are (and seem to be) also unequal; each one of these ways represents a possi le reading for the indefinite pronouns we find at the line Phd. 74b7. In the Phaedo, Plato's use of the pronouns is intentiona ly indeterminate (as indeed is his use of the verb φαίνομαι) in order to express in just one sentence the many different ways in which the sensi le objects can display their indeterminacy.
Separation
Plato's use of the indefinite pronouns in the op ositional construction τῷ μὲν ... τῷ δ' οὔ represents an ingenious device to express the various relations that every sensi le object holds with other things. These relations are constitutive of the sensi le objects and they determine what properties these objects actua ly have. In fact, the sensi le objects are involved in so many relations that for each property they have there wi l be another relation in which they display the exact contrary property. That is why Plato uses the pronouns together with the particles μὲν and δὲ in an op ositional construction.
The Forms, on the other hand, do not hold any kind of relation to other things, and that is why they are not described by relative pronouns in op ositional construction but by the intensive pronoun αὐτός. The contrast between the expression τῷ μὲν … τῷ δ' οὔ used to describe the sensi le things and the expression αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτὸ used to describe the Forms represents, therefore, a synta ical device designed to express the distinction between a relational kind of object and a non-relational, isolated kind of entity. Sensi le objects have their properties in relation to other things, and that feature makes them subject to op osite predications and, since their relations are always changing, also unsta le entities. Forms, on the other hand, have their properties by themselves in the sense that their lack of relation with other things makes them perfect, sta le and independent unities, described only by their self-predication. Now, if we assume Vlastos' thesis according to which the expressions εἶναι χωρίς and εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ'αὑτὸ "are meant to enunciate the same metaphysical claim" (1987, p. 190) , we come to the conclusion that to be χωρίς (separate) means nothing more than to be "isolate" , which is actua ly the ordinary meaning of this word! In contrast to sensi le relational things that are what they are only because of their relations to other things, a Form is separate (χωρίς) in the sense that it is what it is itself by itself (αὐτὸ καθ'αὑτὸ).
Of course, I am not wi ling to say that Forms are not ontologica ly independent, prior or transcendent entities. In fact, these ontological features are intrinsica ly connected to the fact that Forms are un-relational, isolated entities. However, it seems to me that to understand the expressions εἶναι χωρίς and εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ'αὑτὸ as equivalent to these sophisticated metaphysical theses is misleading in the sense that it undermines the descriptive value of these expressions and, as a consequence, the most fundamental metaphysical claim attached to them.
To make it clear, my point is that we do not need to understand separation as a technical term formulated to express complex philosophical claims such as ontological priority, ontological independence or even transcendence. The distinction between non-relational and relational entities is at the core of Plato's metaphysics, and to say that the Forms are separate is equivalent to stating this very distinction. To be separate is to be set apart, disconnected from everything else, isolated, but nothing more than that.
